



Taking It Seriously: Repairing Domestic Violence 
Sentencing in Washington State 
Patricia Sully† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Damon Overby wrapped a towel around his girlfriend’s neck and 
proceeded to violently choke her.1 This was not Overby’s first of-
fense⎯in fact, he had eight prior domestic violence convictions.2 Yet 
Overby was sentenced to just twelve months work release for his latest 
domestic violence conviction.3 
Gary Ruffcorn had a similar criminal history: six prior fourth-
degree assault domestic violence convictions, three prior violations of a 
no-contact order, and two prior felony drug convictions.4 But when Ruff-
corn physically assaulted his girlfriend again, despite nine prior domestic 
violence convictions, only the nonviolent drug charges affected his of-
fender score.5 Ruffcorn’s long history of domestic violence simply did 
not matter: the convictions carried no weight for the purpose of sentenc-
ing.6 Thus, despite his extensive domestic violence history, Ruffcorn’s 
                                                            
† J.D. Candidate, Seattle University School of Law, 2011; B.A., Ancient Greek and Religion, Calvin 
College, 2004. I would like to thank David Martin who generously shared much of his own time, 
research, and insight. I would also like to thank Hayley Montgomery, Paige Spratt, Nina Scheel, and 
the members of the Seattle University Law Review for all of their hard work and invaluable assis-
tance. Last, but not least, I would like to thank my mother, Fae Sully, and my family for their con-
stant and unending support. 
 1. Ruth Teichroeb, Cracking Down on Chronic Batterers: Task Force Considers Toughening 
Sentencing Law, SEATTLE POST–INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 5, 2008, at A1, available at 
http://www.seattlepi.com/local/377793_abuse05.html. There are no reported cases for Overby, Ruff-
corn, or Greene because, as the cases did not involve novel areas of law, there was never a superior 
court opinion written. 
 2. ROB MCKENNA, WASH. STATE OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SENTENCING 
REFORM: ENHANCED PENALTIES FOR REPEAT/SERIAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OFFENDERS 2 (2009) 
[hereinafter PROPOSAL], available at http://www.sgc.wa.gov/Minutes/11_Nov_08_DV_Sentencing_ 
Reform_Package.pdf. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 5. 
 5. Id. at 6. 
 6. Id. 
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standard sentencing range barely differed from that of a misdemeanor 
sentence.7 
Similarly, Marvin Greene racked up five misdemeanor domestic 
violence convictions, including two for domestic violence assault in the 
fourth degree, all against the same victim⎯his girlfriend.8 But when 
Greene was convicted of felony domestic violence tampering with the 
same victim, he was considered a first-time offender.9 The court simply 
gave no consideration to Greene’s long history of domestic violence as-
sault.10 
Stories of repeat domestic violence offenders are common due to 
the pervasiveness of domestic violence in the United States.11 In one 
study, nearly 25% of all women and 7.6% of all men surveyed reported 
being raped or physically assaulted by a current or former partner, 
spouse, or date.12 Domestic violence is unique both because of its na-
ture⎯abuse within the context of an intimate relationship⎯and because 
of its collateral consequences.13 For years, feminists, scholars, law en-
forcement, and the judiciary have grappled with the question of how to 
address domestic violence. Today, further research from public-health 
professionals has shown the depth and cost of domestic violence.14 While 
many agree that domestic violence needs to be taken seriously, parties 
disagree as to what “seriously” means. Is increased sentencing and the 
expansion of the prison system the solution, or is it a part of the prob-
lem? It is unclear how the criminal justice system should address domes-
tic violence. 
In 2009, Washington State Attorney General Rob McKenna pro-
posed legislation to increase sentencing for repeat felony domestic vi-
olence offenders in Washington State.15 According to McKenna, the new 
legislation “offers relief to the victims of domestic violence, brings ab-
                                                            
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoeness, Nat’l Inst. of Justice & Ctrs. for Disease Control and 
Prevention, Extent, Nature, and Consequences of Intimate Partner Violence: Findings From the 
National Violence Against Women Survey, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW 108, 109 (Nancy K. D. 
Lemon ed., 3d ed. 2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/181867.htm. The 
survey consisted of telephone interviews with a nationally representative sample, 8,000 U.S. women 
and 8,000 U.S. men, about their experiences with domestic violence. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See generally Joan Zorza, Women Battering: High Costs and the State of the Law, in 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW, supra note 11, at 11. 
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. See PROPOSAL, supra note 2. 
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users to justice, and treats serial domestic violence with the seriousness 
that it deserves.”16 
To create the legislative proposal (Proposal), McKenna convened a 
domestic violence advisory committee made up of prosecutors, police 
officers, and victim advocates.17 The advisory committee agreed that the 
sentencing rules for chronic domestic abusers were inadequate⎯the rules 
did not “require judges to take into account the previous misdemeanor 
domestic violence convictions of the most dangerous offenders.”18 Fur-
thermore, the sentencing rules were inconsistent with the way other non-
violent crimes were sentenced. For example, a car thief with Overby’s 
record would be guaranteed at least three years in prison.19 Yet Overby 
received only twelve months work release.20 Because at the time, courts 
did not factor misdemeanor domestic violence convictions into offender 
scores, an offender could repeatedly batter his victim without receiving 
more than a proverbial slap on the wrist.21 Thus, McKenna proposed a 
new sentencing structure to rectify the inadequacy of the old rules and 
bring domestic violence sentencing in line with both sentencing for other 
crimes and the seriousness of the crime itself.22 The Washington State 
legislature passed House Bill 2777 (HB 2777) in March 2010, enacting 
the proposed sentencing structure; Governor Christine Gregoire signed 
HB 2777 into law in on April 1, 2010.23 The new sentencing structure 
becomes effective in August 2011.24 
This Comment explores Washington State’s recent increase in sen-
tencing for chronic domestic violence offenders, concluding that the in-
crease is a significant step towards treating domestic violence with the 
seriousness it deserves. Part II discusses the costs and consequences of 
domestic violence. Part III provides a brief history of domestic violence 
laws and discusses the evolution of domestic violence sentencing in 
Washington State. Part IV explains HB 2777. Part V explores the 
                                                            
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Teichroeb, supra note 1; see also David Martin, Senior Deputy Prosecutor, King County 
Prosecuting Attorney’s Office, Workshop at Are We There Yet? Commemorating the Past, Celebrat-
ing the Future: A 30th Anniversary Domestic Violence Symposium: Making the Case for Progres-
sive Penalties for Chronic DV Offenders (Sept. 12, 2009). 
 20. Teichroeb, supra note 1. 
 21. Martin, supra note 19. 
 22. See PROPOSAL, supra note 2; H.B. 2777, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess., 2010 Wash. Sess. Laws 
2179, available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2009-10/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Law% 
202010/2777-S.SL.pdf. 
 23. H.B. 2777. 
 24. See id. § 403(21)(a). 
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strengths and weaknesses of HB 2777. Finally, Part VI concludes and 
offers suggestions for change. 
II. COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN 
WASHINGTON STATE 
Domestic violence is a critical public health and criminal justice is-
sue⎯domestic violence often leads to serious injuries or homicide, and 
the impact on children who witness domestic violence is significant.25 
“An estimated ten to twenty percent of emergency department visits by 
women with partners . . . are [the] result of domestic violence.”26 One in 
five women in Washington report having been injured by domestic vi-
olence sometime in their lifetime.27 And in a 2006 survey of women in 
Washington and Idaho, 44% of respondents reported some form of inti-
mate-partner violence as an adult.28 On average, more than 50,000 do-
mestic violence reports are filed each year in Washington alone.29 In fact, 
domestic violence calls “constitute the single largest category of [emer-
gency] calls received by [the] police.”30 
The number of domestic violence fatalities is staggering⎯between 
January 1997 and June 2010, there were at least 755 deaths in Washing-
ton State alone.31 Further, the number of domestic violence fatalities is 
                                                            
 25. WASH. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, THE HEALTH OF WASHINGTON STATE: DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE 1 (2002), available at http://www.doh.wa.gov/HWS/doc/IV/IV_DV.doc; KING CNTY., 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND CHILD MALTREATMENT COORDINATED RESPONSE GUIDELINE 14 (2010), 
available at http://your.kingcounty.gov/kcsc/docs/DVResponseGuideline.pdf. 
 26. WASH. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 25. 
 27. Id. 
 28. KELLY STARR, WASH. STATE COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, COVERING DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE: A GUIDE FOR JOURNALISTS AND OTHER MEDIA PROFESSIONALS 7 (2008), available at 
http://www.wscadv.org/docs/Media_Guide_2008.pdf (citing Robert Thompson et al., Intimate Part-
ner Violence Prevalence, Types, and Chronicity in Adult Women, 30 AM. J. OF PREVENTIVE MED. 
447 (2006)). This Group Health study surveyed 3,429 randomly sampled women and asked about 
their exposure to intimate-partner violence. Thompson et al., supra at 447–79. 
 29. See WASH. UNIF. CRIME REPORTING PROGRAM, WASH. ASS’N OF SHERIFFS AND POLICE 
CHIEFS, CRIME IN WASHINGTON 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 110 (2010), available at 
http://www.waspc.org/files.php?fid=3353. 
 30. ANDREW R. KLEIN, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, NCJ 225722, PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF 
CURRENT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RESEARCH: FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, PROSECUTORS, AND JUDGES 
1 (2009), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/225722.pdf. The purpose of this work is to 
describe to practitioners the day-to-day implications of the current domestic violence research. Id. at 
vi. 
 31. JAKE FAWCETT, WASHINGTON COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, UP TO US: LESSONS 
LEARNED AND GOALS FOR CHANGE AFTER THIRTEEN YEARS OF THE WASHINGTON STATE 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FATALITY REVIEW 10 (2010), available at http://www.wscadv.org/docs/FR-
2010-Report.pdf. The DVFR defines a “domestic violence fatality as a death that arises from an 
abuser’s efforts to assert power and control over an intimate partner.” Id. This definition includes: 
1. All homicides in which the victim was a current or former intimate partner of the per-
son responsible for the homicide. 
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likely much higher; the Domestic Violence Fatality Review (DVFR) 
states that their data “undercount[s] the true number of domestic vi-
olence-related fatalities in five key areas”: (1) children killed by domes-
tic violence abusers, (2) homicides that occurred within same-sex rela-
tionships, (3) homicides mistakenly classified as suicides or accidents, 
(4) missing women cases and unsolved homicides, and (5) suicides of 
domestic violence victims.32 Additionally, approximately 60,000 children 
in King County alone are exposed to domestic violence each year.33 
The physical abuse of domestic violence is often accompanied by 
emotional abuse, controlling behavior, and verbal abuse.34 Domestic vi-
olence impairs a victim’s ability to function in daily life, maintain rela-
tionships, and keep a job.35 Batterers often attempt to isolate their victims 
from friends and family, and the emotional consequences of battering, 
such as shame or embarrassment, can further serve to isolate victims.36 
Additionally, domestic violence victims often take time off of work in 
order to visit the doctor or recover from beatings,37 making it difficult to 
maintain employment.38 Escaping the violence is often complicated, time 
consuming, and may require the victim to completely abandon her job, 
home, and belongings.39 
In addition to the physical and emotional toll domestic violence 
creates for victims, their friends, and their families, domestic violence 
also has a significant financial cost.40 The national health-related costs of 
rape, physical assault, stalking, and homicide by intimate partners exceed 
$5.8 billion each year.41 Of this total, nearly $4.1 billion is for victims 
                                                                                                                                     
2. Homicides of people other than the intimate partner that occur in the context of intimate 
partner violence, or in the midst of a perpetrator’s attempt to kill an intimate partner 
(for example, situations in which an abuser kills a current or former partner’s friend, 
family member, or new intimate partner, or a law enforcement officer). 
3. Homicides that are an extension of or in response to ongoing intimate partner abuse (for 
example, cases in which an abuser takes revenge on a victim by killing the victim’s 
children). 
4. Suicides of abusers that happen in the context of intimate partner violence. 
Id. 
 32. Id. at 14; see also STARR, supra note 28, at 6. 
 33. Martin, supra note 19. 
 34. Tjaden & Thoeness, supra note 11, at 110. 
 35. Sushma Kapoor, Domestic Violence Against Women and Girls, 6 INNOCENTI DIGEST 1, 12–
13 (2000), available at http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/digest6e.pdf. 
 36. Id. at 4. 
 37. Id. at 14. 
 38. Barbara Johnson, Reducing Intimate Partner Abuse: A Look at National, State, and Local 
Strategies for the Prevention of Domestic Violence, MINN. CTR. AGAINST VIOLENCE & ABUSE (Apr. 
8, 2002), http://www.mincava.umn.edu/documents/barbara/barbara.html. 
 39. Id. 
 40. DV Myths, AM. INST. ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http://aidv-usa.com/myths.html (last vi-
sited Feb. 9, 2011). 
 41. Id. 
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requiring direct medical and mental-health services.42 Moreover, lost 
productivity and earnings due to domestic violence account for almost 
$1.8 billion each year.43 The World Health Organization reports that 
“[r]ape and domestic violence account for 5% to 16% of healthy years of 
life lost by women of reproductive age.”44 Another study, reported by the 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), estimates the direct cost of 
domestic violence in the United States between five and ten billion dol-
lars annually.45 
Despite the pervasive nature and extensive cost of domestic vi-
olence, it has not always been recognized as a serious crime in Washing-
ton. In fact, for much of Washington’s history, it was completely ig-
nored. The next Part will provide a brief history of domestic violence law 
in the United States and Washington, and conclude by discussing the 
evolution of domestic violence sentencing in Washington. 
III. EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SENTENCING IN 
WASHINGTON STATE 
In order to understand the import of Washington’s current sentenc-
ing change, it is important to understand the development of domestic 
violence law. Section A will provide a brief history of the courts’ treat-
ment of domestic violence in the United States, and section B will ex-
amine the development of domestic violence law in Washington State. 
A. History of Domestic Violence Law in the United States 
During the eighteenth century, English common law recognized the 
right of husbands to physically discipline their wives under the rule of 
chastisement.46 Under this rule, because a man was responsible for his 
wife’s behavior, it was permissible for him to discipline her.47 The rule 
of chastisement had one limit: a man could only beat his wife in a “mod-
erate” manner.48 The limitation on the rule of chastisement came to be 
                                                            
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Anthony Rodgers, Quantifying Selected Major Risks to Health, WHO WORLD HEALTH 
REP., 2002, at 47, 80, available at http://www.who.int/whr/2002/Chapter4.pdf. 
 45. Kapoor, supra note 35, at 12. 
 46. Virginia H. Murray, A Comparative Survey of the Historic Civil, Common, and American 
Indian Tribal Law Responses to Domestic Violence, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW, supra note 11, at 
2, 6. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
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known as the “rule of thumb”: a man was permitted to beat his wife with 
a rod or stick, so long as it was not thicker than his thumb.49 
Initially, American colonies outlawed “wife abuse,” but the new co-
lonial courts were soon pressured into following the English common 
law.50 Despite calling the rule “barbaric,”51 American courts in the early 
nineteenth century permitted a man to chastise his wife “without subject-
ing himself to vexatious prosecutions for assault and battery, resulting in 
the discredit and shame of all parties concerned.”52 Well after the Revo-
lutionary War, new states generally incorporated the English common 
law.53 For example, in 1864, a North Carolina court held: 
[A husband may] use towards his wife such a degree of force as 
is necessary to control an unruly temper and make her behave 
herself; and unless some permanent injury be inflicted . . . to gra-
tify his own bad passions, the law will not invade the domestic 
forum or go behind the curtain.54 
By the mid-nineteenth century, the “conceptions of authority and 
family structure” were changing in America, if not in the courts.55 In 
1848, the emerging women’s movement issued a formal Declaration of 
Sentiments, in which it “publicly denounced the common law doctrines 
of marital status and the hierarchical, vertical structure of American so-
ciety.”56 Still, it took over twenty years for the first American court to 
officially reject a husband’s right to chastise his wife.57 In 1871, the Ala-
bama Supreme Court declared: 
                                                            
 49. Caroline Dettmer, Comment, Increased Sentencing for Repeat Offenders of Domestic Vi-
olence in Ohio: Will this End the Suffering?, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 705, 709 (2004); see People v. Ro-
mero, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 332, 341 n.14 (Ct. App. 1993). 
 50. Murray, supra note 46, at 6. 
 51. James Martin Truss, Comment, The Subjection of Women . . . Still: Unfulfilled Promises of 
Protection for Women Victims of Domestic Violence, 26 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1149, 1158 (1995); see 
Dettmer, supra note 49, at 710. 
 52. Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1528 (D. Conn. 1984) (quoting B. 
Finesmith, Police Response to Battered Women: Critique and Proposals for Reform, 14 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 74, 79 (1983)). 
 53. See Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, in 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW, supra note 11, at 7. 
 54. State v. Black, 60 N.C. (1 Win.) 262 (1864); see Murray, supra note 46, at 7. 
 55. Murray, supra note 46, at 7. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143 (1871). In that same year, despite defendant’s request that 
the court instruct the jury that “the husband had a legal right to administer due and proper correction 
and corporeal chastisement on his wife,” the Massachusetts Supreme Court nonetheless held that 
“beating or striking a wife violently with the open hand is not one of the rights conferred on a hus-
band by the marriage, even if the wife be drunk or insolent.” Commonwealth v. McAfee, 108 Mass. 
458, 459, 461 (1871); see Siegel, supra note 53, at 9. 
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Therefore, a rod which may be drawn through the wedding ring 
is not now deemed necessary to teach the wife her duty and sub-
jection to the husband. . . . [T]he privilege, ancient though it be, 
to beat her with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her, spit in her 
face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like indig-
nities, is not now acknowledged by our law.58 
By the 1890s, American courts completely abandoned the idea that a 
husband may legally chastise his wife within reasonable limits.59 
While laws prohibiting chastisement were enacted, they were rarely 
enforced.60 Instead, courts began to ignore domestic violence based on 
“domestic harmony” concerns;61 domestic violence was perceived to be 
an internal family matter, best left free from state interference.62 As one 
court stated, “We will not inflict upon society the greater evil of raising 
the curtain upon domestic privacy, to punish the lesser evil of trifling 
violence.”63 Instead of using the “hierarchal-based” chastisement lan-
guage, jurists began to employ “affective privacy” language.64 Such lan-
guage invoked “the feelings and spaces of domesticity.”65 More impor-
tantly, it translated an antiquated idea⎯the rule of chastisement⎯into a 
modern context that felt profoundly reasonable⎯domestic privacy.66 By 
invoking marital- or domestic-privacy justifications, the courts preserved 
the system of oppression by changing only the language.67 These justifi-
cations held firm until the 1960s, when domestic violence once again 
became a national issue.68 
In the 1960s, legal-aid lawyers and feminists recognized that the 
nonexistent domestic violence laws “provided little or no relief to abused 
wives.”69 In response, advocates worked to develop services for domestic 
violence victims and pressured law-enforcement officers, the courts, and 
the legislature to recognize the severity and pervasiveness of domestic 
violence.70 Furthermore, advocates pushed for new legislation that expli-
                                                            
 58. Fulgham, 46 Ala. at 146 (citations omitted). 
 59. Siegel, supra note 53, at 8; Dettmer, supra note 49, at 710. 
 60. Siegel, supra note 53, at 8. 
 61. Id. 
 62. State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil.) 453 (1868). 
 63. Id. at 459. 
 64. Siegel, supra note 53, at 8. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Murray, supra note 46, at 7. 
 69. Bernadette Dunn Sewell, History of Abuse: Societal, Judicial, and Legislative Responses to 
the Problem of Wife Beating, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV 983, 996 (1989). 
 70. Id. at 996–97. 
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citly named domestic violence as a crime.71 At the same time, advocates 
sought to educate the public about domestic violence through the media, 
public speaking engagements, and outreach programs.72 
Despite increased public awareness of domestic violence, police 
departments in the 1960s adopted policies mandating mediation in do-
mestic violence cases, reinforcing the deeply entrenched belief that do-
mestic violence was not a crime, but rather a dispute in which both par-
ties were to blame.73 These policies reinforced the idea that domestic vi-
olence did not have the same legal stature or importance as an equally 
violent assault on a stranger.74 Despite police policies, in the 1970s, 
states began to take steps to recognize domestic violence as a serious 
crime.75 Washington State did so by enacting the Domestic Violence Act 
(DVA) in 1979.76 
B. Domestic Violence Sentencing in Washington State 
Prior to 1979, domestic violence was not explicitly mentioned in 
Washington law. In 1979, however, the legislature recognized domestic 
violence as a “community problem that accounts for a ‘significant per-
centage’ of violent crimes in the nation and is disruptive to ‘personal and 
community life.’”77 To address the domestic violence problem, the legis-
lature enacted what became the Revised Code of Washington (RCW) 
70.123, providing funds and standards for shelters serving domestic vi-
olence victims.78 The law states in part: 
The legislature finds that domestic violence is an issue of grow-
ing concern at all levels of government and that there is a present 
and growing need to develop innovative strategies and services 
which will ameliorate and reduce the trauma of domestic vi-
olence. Research findings show that domestic violence consti-
tutes a significant percentage of homicides, aggravated assaults, 
and assaults and batteries in the United States.79 
In that same year, the Washington State legislature enacted what 
became RCW 10.99, the DVA, which recognized domestic violence as a 
                                                            
 71. See id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Dettmer, supra note 49, at 712; Marion Wanless, Note, Mandatory Arrest: A Step Toward 
Eradicating Domestic Violence, But Is It Enough?, 1996 U. Ill. L. Rev. 533, 537. 
 74. Dettmer, supra note 49, at 712. 
 75. See Sewell, supra note 69, at 997. 
 76. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.99 (2010); Danny v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., 165 Wash. 2d 200, 
208–10, 193 P.3d 128 (2008). 
 77. Laidlaw, 165 Wash. 2d at 208–09 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 70.123.010). 
 78. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.123.010 (2010); Laidlaw, 165 Wash. 2d at 209. 
 79. § 70.123.010. 
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serious crime and required law enforcement, prosecutors, and the courts 
to “respond to domestic violence.”80 The legislature stated its purpose 
was not only to recognize the importance of domestic violence as a se-
rious crime, but also to “assure the victim of domestic violence the max-
imum protection from abuse which the law . . . can provide.”81 Finally, 
the legislature articulated its intent that the response to domestic violence 
be “the enforcement of the laws to protect the victim and . . . [to] com-
municate the attitude that violent behavior is not excused or tolerated.”82 
While the DVA recognized the serious nature of domestic violence, 
it did not create a crime called “domestic violence.” In fact, it explicitly 
stated “[t]he legislature finds that the existing criminal statutes are ade-
quate to provide protection for victims of domestic violence.”83 It ac-
knowledged that in the past, “societal attitudes” were “reflected in poli-
cies and practices of law enforcement agencies and prosecutors” result-
ing in “differing treatment of crimes occurring between cohabitants and 
of the same crimes occurring between strangers.”84 The DVA, therefore, 
articulated its intent to ensure the full and equal enforcement of the laws 
in the context of domestic violence, and it made clear that a crime should 
not be treated as less serious simply because it occurred in the domestic 
context.85 It did not, however, increase sentencing for crimes of domestic 
violence or differentiate crimes of domestic violence from other 
crimes⎯it simply recognized the serious nature of domestic violence and 
mandated that it be treated like any other crime.86 
Shortly after enacting the DVA, the legislature enacted the first ver-
sion of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA), which recog-
nized the growing nature of the domestic violence crisis and created the 
civil Order for Protection for victims of domestic violence.87 The legisla-
ture found that, “Domestic violence costs millions of dollars each year in 
the state of Washington for health care, absence from work, services to 
children, and more. The crisis is growing.”88 
                                                            
 80. WASH. REV. CODE, § 10.99.010 (2010); Laidlaw, 165 Wash. 2d at 209. 
 81. § 10.99.010. 
 82. Id. It is noteworthy that the legislature discusses not only its intent to change the response 
to domestic violence, but also its intent to “communicate the attitude that violent behavior is not 
excused or tolerated.” Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Roy v. City of Everett, 118 Wash. 2d 352, 358, 823 P.2d 1084 (1992) (“RCW 
10.99 . . . emphasized the need to enforce existing criminal statutes in an evenhanded manner to 
protect the victim regardless of whether the victim was involved in a relationship with the aggres-
sor.”). 
 86. Id. 
 87. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50 (2010). 
 88. § 26.50.030. 
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The DVA’s failure to specifically increase sentencing for domestic 
violence crimes perhaps made sense in 1979, when felony offenders 
were sentenced in broad ranges and sentences were indetermi-
nate⎯courts had significant discretion in deciding whether to impose a 
sentence and what the length of the sentence should be.89 But Washing-
ton’s Sentencing Reform Act (SRA), enacted in 1981, changed the sen-
tencing discrepancies of the old rules.90 
Prior to the SRA, judges had broad discretion to implement sen-
tences, resulting in offenders who committed similar crimes receiving 
substantially different sentences.91 The goal of the SRA was to fix incon-
sistencies by ensuring that offenders who had similar criminal histories 
and had committed similar crimes were similarly sentenced.92 The SRA 
curtailed courts’ wide discretion and determined sentences by the of-
fense’s seriousness and the offender’s history, as opposed to the pure 
discretion of the trial judge.93 The SRA did not, however, enhance penal-
ties for crimes of domestic violence.94 Rather, felony domestic violence 
offenses were given the same weight as nondomestic offenses, and prior 
domestic offenses were given the same weight as their nondomestic 
counterparts.95 
Under the SRA, crimes are sentenced according to a standardized 
sentencing grid, and in practice, crimes of domestic violence are sen-
tenced like all other crimes.96 While there is a domestic violence designa-
tion under the DVA, the designation is not an element of the crime and 
does not need to be described in the charging information.97 This is be-
cause the DVA did not create any new crimes⎯it simply emphasized 
that existing statutes needed to be enforced in domestic violence situa-
tions.98 Calling a crime domestic violence “does not itself alter the ele-
ments of the underlying offense; rather, it signals the court that the law is 
to be equitably and vigorously enforced.”99 Thus, under the DVA, crimes 
of domestic violence are qualitatively equal to other crimes⎯there is no 
difference between a bar fight and a domestic assault. 
                                                            
 89. Martin, supra note 19. 
 90. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A (2010); see Martin, supra note 19. 
 91. Martin, supra note 19. 
 92. § 9.94A.010; Martin, supra note 19. 
 93. §§ 9.94A.510–.515; see Martin, supra note 19. 
 94. §§ 9.94A.510–.515. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See § 9.94A; Martin, supra note 19. 
 97. State v. Goodman, 108 Wash. App. 355, 359, 30 P.3d 516 (2001) (“A sufficient informa-
tion states the essential elements of each charged crime so that the accused may understand the 
charges and prepare a defense.” (citations omitted)). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. (quoting State v. O.P., 103 Wash. App. 889, 892, 13 P.3d 1111 (2000)). 
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Blakely v. Washington further changed domestic violence sentenc-
ing and curtailed the courts’ ability to enhance sentences.100 In Blakely, 
the Court held that any factual finding that authorized a judge to exceed 
the standard sentence range must be found to exist beyond a reasonable 
doubt by a jury.101 In Blakely, Ralph Blakely abducted his estranged 
wife, Yolanda, who had filed for divorce, from their home.102 He bound 
her with duct tape and forced her at knifepoint into a wooden box in the 
bed of his pickup truck, all the while imploring her to dismiss the divorce 
suit and related trust proceedings.103 “When the couple’s 13-year-old 
son . . . returned home from school, [Blakely] ordered him to follow in 
another car, threatening to harm Yolanda with a shotgun if he did not do 
so.”104 Blakely pleaded guilty to second-degree kidnapping involving 
domestic violence.105 The facts admitted in Blakely’s plea supported a 
maximum sentence of fifty-three months. Nevertheless, the judge found 
there to be “deliberate cruelty,” a statutorily imposed ground to sentence 
outside of the standard range, and sentenced Blakely to ninety months in 
prison⎯thirty-seven months above the standard range.106 The Court held 
that because the facts supporting Blakely’s exceptional sentence were 
neither admitted by him nor found by a jury, the sentence violated Blake-
ly’s Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.107 
Washington State responded to Blakely by changing its procedures 
to require a jury trial for all contested facts that authorize an aggravated 
exceptional sentence.108 Additionally, “[t]he legislature . . . codified all 
                                                            
 100. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 298. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 300. 
 107. Id. at 305. In Blakely, the Court applied the rule of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 
(2000), which held, “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for 
a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” Id. at 301. In Blakely, the Court stated: 
The judge in this case could not have imposed the exceptional 90-month sentence solely 
on the basis of the facts admitted in the guilty plea. Those facts alone were insufficient 
because, as the Washington Supreme Court has explained, “[a] reason offered to justify 
an exceptional sentence can be considered only if it takes into account factors other than 
those which are used in computing the standard range sentence for the offense,” which in 
this case included the elements of second-degree kidnapping and the use of a firearm. 
Had the judge imposed the 90-month sentence solely on the basis of the plea, he would 
have been reversed. 
Id. at 304 (citations omitted). 
 108. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, DISCRETION UNDER THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT 
AND THE IMPACT OF BLAKELY V. WASHINGTON 9 (2005), available at http://www.sgc.wa.gov/ 
PUBS/SRA_Review_BlakelyReport.pdf. 
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aggravating factors which had been approved by the appellate courts and 
made the new list of aggravating factors exclusive.”109 The list of aggra-
vating factors includes deliberate cruelty to the victim, knowledge that 
the victim is pregnant, and history of domestic violence.110 History of 
domestic violence, however, only applied to the same victim.111 Thus, 
while aggravating factors could still be used to increase sentences, Blake-
ly further limited a court’s ability to fashion sentences based on a per-
son’s overall domestic violence history. 
After Blakely, one question remained: what exactly was the domes-
tic violence designation under the DVPA? State v. Hagler was the “logi-
cal result” following the procedural and legislative changes made by the 
state.112 In Hagler, the defendant was a forty-year-old man without a sta-
ble place to live.113 He began an intimate relationship with the victim, a 
nineteen-year-old cosmetology student, and moved into her apartment.114 
Soon after, Hagler gave the victim approximately $1,300 in cash and 
gifts, which the victim believed was in exchange for a place to live.115 
Subsequently, Hagler assaulted the victim, hit her several times with a 
gun, and told her that she “owed him” and “was going to go and be a 
prostitute and give him back all of his money.”116 Further, he held a gun 
to her temple and told her that he would kill her.117 The victim had never 
been a prostitute before.118 Over the next few days, Hagler drove the vic-
tim to several locations to engage in prostitution, instructing her as to the 
type of men to look for.119 While she was on the street, he kept the car 
and keys to her apartment and called her repeatedly to see whether she 
had “met anyone” and to see how much money she had earned.120 He 
threatened to kill her if she went to the police.121 But the third time Hag-
ler took the victim out to be a prostitute, she escaped to the police and 
helped lure Hagler to a meeting, where the police arrested him.122 The 
State, among other charges, charged Hagler with assault in the second 
                                                            
 109. Id. 
 110. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.535(3)(a), (c), (h) (2010). 
 111. § 9.94A.535(h)(i); see also PROPOSAL, supra note 2, at 9. 
 112. Martin, supra note 19. 
 113. State v. Hagler, 150 Wash. App. 196, 198, 208 P.3d 32 (2009). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 199. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
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degree and promoting prostitution in the first degree, and designated both 
as crimes of domestic violence.123 
Prior to trial, Hagler requested the court “not to inform the jury of 
the domestic violence designations.”124 But the court “denied the motion 
and read the charges as they appeared in the information.”125 Similarly, at 
the end of the trial, Hagler objected to the domestic violence designation 
being included in the jury instructions.126 Again, the court overruled the 
objection and the designation appeared several times in both the jury in-
structions and verdict forms.127 Hagler appealed, contending that inform-
ing the jury of the domestic violence designation was “prejudicial and 
unnecessary.”128 In response, the State contended that the designation 
“merely allow[ed] the jury to understand the exact charges.”129 
On appeal, the court held the domestic violence designation was not 
helpful to a jury and may result in prejudice; thus, a jury should not be 
informed that a crime has been designated a crime of domestic vi-
olence.130 In making this determination, the court considered the purpose 
of the DVPA and further stated that the designation “does not itself alter 
the elements of the underlying offense; rather, it signals the court that the 
law is to be equitably and vigorously enforced.”131 The court asserted 
that because the domestic violence designation is neither an element of 
the crime nor evidence relevant to an element, it does not assist the jury, 
whose job is to determine whether the State has proved the elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt.132 Therefore, according to the court, because 
the domestic violence designation was of no assistance and may result in 
prejudice, juries should not be told that a crime is a crime of domestic 
violence.133 
Thus, there is still no actual crime of domestic violence in Wash-
ington. Moreover, simply being labeled a crime of domestic violence 
does not increase sentencing, or in the opinion of the Hagler court, “as-
sist the jury in its task.”134 While an aggravating factor can be used to 
increase sentencing, prior to HB 2777, it did not apply to recidivist ab-
users who do not abuse the same victim. Therefore, while the legal re-
                                                            
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 200. 
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 128. Id. at 202. 
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 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 201 (citing State v. O.P., 103 Wash. App. 889, 892, 13 P.3d 1111 (2000)). 
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sponse to domestic violence has made great strides from the days when it 
was legally sanctioned or totally ignored as a private family matter, it is 
still not recognized as a crime that is serious and distinct from other 
types of assaults. 
IV. HOUSE BILL 2777 
House Bill 2777, based on the Proposal by Rob McKenna, was in-
troduced to the Washington State legislature by Representative Roger 
Goodman on January 14, 2010, and changes the current state sentencing 
guidelines for domestic violence.135 The Bill “sets point levels to deter-
mine the offender score level of domestic violence, taking into account 
prior acts and continued abuse.”136 Governor Christine Gregoire signed 
the Bill into law on April 1, 2010.137 
According to McKenna, “The hard work of pursuing and prosecut-
ing repeat domestic violence offenders too often results in weak sen-
tences that fail to protect the victim or to properly account for prior do-
mestic violence convictions.”138 McKenna asserts that the result of this 
failure is that offenders become indifferent to legal consequences, the 
cycle of violence continues, victims are put at greater risk, and many vic-
tims lose hope.139 In HB 2777, the legislature specifically states it intends 
to “give law enforcement and the courts better tools to identify violent 
perpetrators of domestic violence and hold them accountable.”140 To this 
end, the Bill institutes numerous changes in domestic violence sentenc-
ing, including (1) scoring prior misdemeanor domestic violence of-
fenses,141 (2) multiplying repeat domestic violence felony convictions,142 
(3) adding a “serial offender” aggravating circumstance143 and a “victim-
defendant” mitigating circumstance.144 Additionally, the domestic vi-
olence designation now needs to be pleaded and proved in order to con-
form with Blakely.145 
                                                            
 135. 2010 House Bill 2777, WASH. VOTES, http://www.washingtonvotes.org/2010-HB-2777 
(last visited Feb. 9, 2011); see PROPOSAL, supra note 2. 
 136. WASH. VOTES, supra note 135. 
 137. Id. The Bill was signed with a partial veto to section 202, which is unrelated to the scope 
of this Comment. Id. 
 138. PROPOSAL, supra note 2, at 5. 
 139. Id. 
 140. H.B. 2777 § 101, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess., 2010 Wash. Sess. Laws 2179, available at 
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2009-10/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Law%202010/2777-
S.SL.pdf. 
 141. Id. § 403(21)(c). 
 142. Id. § 403(21)(a). 
 143. Id. § 402(3)(h)(i). 
 144. Id. § 402(1)(h)(i). 
 145. See supra Part III.B. 
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A. Prior Misdemeanors Are Scored 
HB 2777 allows judges to consider a convicted defendant’s prior 
convictions for domestic violence-related misdemeanor crimes.146 Prior 
to HB 2777, misdemeanor domestic violence crimes were not included in 
an offender score calculation.147 HB 2777 creates a class of “repetitive 
domestic violence offense[s],”148 which includes nonfelony domestic 
violence assault, violation of a no-contact order or domestic violence 
protection order, domestic violence stalking, and domestic violence ha-
rassment.149 Thus, misdemeanors now matter: if a defendant is convicted 
of a felony domestic violence offense, the offender receives one 
point⎯and a corresponding longer sentence⎯for each prior adult repeti-
tive domestic violence offense where domestic violence was pleaded and 
proved.150 
David Martin, a Senior Prosecutor in King County and the chair of 
the Domestic Violence Unit, states that the repetitive domestic violence 
offenses “are key categories, as scoring would accomplish a critical step 
in sentencing repeat DV offenders by officially recognizing hard-fought 
misdemeanor DV convictions.”151 Moreover, scoring these misdemea-
nors, which are notoriously difficult for prosecutors to win, will help 
bring domestic violence sentencing in line with how other crimes are 
sentenced; for example, prior misdemeanors have long been counted in 
felony traffic offenses when the misdemeanor was “particularly relevant” 
to the felony conviction.152 Hence, HB 2777 creates sentencing consis-
tency for felony domestic violence by subjecting repeat domestic vi-
olence offenders to a sentencing multiplier. 
B. Repeat Domestic Violence Offenders Are  
Subject to a Sentencing Multiplier 
Drug, sex, car theft, and felony traffic offenses are all subject to a 
sentencing multiplier⎯those crimes count more heavily in calculating an 
offender’s score.153 But, prior to HB 2777, felony domestic violence of-
                                                            
 146. H.B. 2777 § 403(21)(c). 
 147. Id. § 403(22). 
 148. Id. § 403(21)(c). 
 149. Id. § 401(39)(a)(i)–(iv). 
 150. Id. § 403(21)(c). 
 151. Martin, supra note 19. 
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 153. H.B. 2777 § 403(21)(a). When a sentencing multiplier is worked into the sentencing 
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to make all theft-of-a-motor-vehicle offenses “triple” if convicted of a future car-theft related of-
fense. H.B. 1001, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess., 2007 Wash. Sess. Laws 741 (codified as amended in scat-
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fenses were not subject to such a sentencing multiplier.154 HB 2777 adds 
a multiplier for each adult and juvenile prior conviction of certain crimes 
of felony domestic violence, including: violation of a no-contact order or 
protection order, harassment, stalking, first-degree burglary, first- and 
second-degree kidnapping, and unlawful imprisonment.155 Thus, for such 
offenses, two points are added to the offender score for each prior adult 
conviction “where domestic violence (as defined in RCW 9.94A.030) 
was [pleaded and proved] after August 1, 2011.”156 For a juvenile of-
fense, one point is counted for each conviction where domestic violence 
has been pleaded and proved after August 1, 2011.157 
The sentencing multiplier does not apply to or multiply all domestic 
violence convictions; it focuses on “core domestic violence felonies.”158 
HB 2777 excludes “domestic violence property crimes, felony violation 
of a no contact order . . . and residential burglary domestic violence.”159 
Moreover, almost all domestic violence felony offenses are in the bottom 
third of the SRA seriousness levels; thus, earning a longer sentence will 
still require multiple convictions.160 Because of the limited nature of HB 
2777, the King County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office estimates that after 
six years, only about 14% of domestic violence cases would be affected 
by the new law.161 Further, HB 2777 does not affect misdemeanor sen-
tencing except to recognize aggravating factors.162 
C. Addition of Felony Aggravating Circumstances (Serial-Offender  
Aggravator) and Felony Mitigating Circumstance  
(Victim Defendant Exception) 
Prior to HB 2777, there was no aggravating factor for a general his-
tory of domestic violence if the same victim was not implicated.163 HB 
2777 changed the aggravating-factor scheme, allowing for “multiple vic-
                                                                                                                                     
S3.SL.pdf. Therefore, if an offender’s criminal history consists of one prior theft of a motor vehicle 
and the offender subsequently committed another theft of a motor vehicle, the offender would have 
three points on the sentencing grid at the time of sentencing of the second car-theft offense. In con-
trast, if the same offender committed a non-car-theft related offense, the offender would have only 
one point on the sentencing grid. Id. 
 154. See H.B. 2777 § 403(21)(a). 
 155. Id. 
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 157. Id. § 403(21)(b). 
 158. PROPOSAL, supra note 2, at 8. 
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 160. Martin, supra note 19. 
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tims” as opposed to only the current victim of domestic violence.164 This 
serial-offender aggravator recognizes the danger of serial batterers and 
allows all past domestic violence history to be considered as a factor in 
sentencing.165 Under the serial-offender aggravator, domestic violence 
offenders can now be held accountable for their prior abuse if they 
(1) would have qualified for the “history of domestic violence” aggrava-
tor with a past victim but have been charged with a crime against a new 
victim or (2) would not have qualified for the history of domestic vi-
olence aggravator with any single victim but have a history of abuse 
across multiple victims. 
In addition to the serial-offender aggravator, HB 2777 added a “vic-
tim defendant” exception as a mitigating factor.166 The language, added 
by the judiciary committee, allows a court to order a lesser sentence for a 
“victim defendant”—an abuse victim who commits a crime in self-
defense.167 This exception can be used as a mitigating factor in sentenc-
ing when “[t]he current offense involved domestic violence, as defined in 
RCW 10.99.020, and the defendant suffered a continuing pattern of coer-
cion, control, or abuse by the victim of the offense and the offense is a 
response to that coercion, control, or abuse.”168 
D. Prosecutors Must Plead and Prove the  
Domestic Violence Designation 
Appellate courts have affirmed the fact that the domestic violence 
designation is largely meaningless.169 Prior to HB 2777, this designation 
was informational only⎯it did not affect punishment.170 Blakely requires 
that any designation that increases an offender’s sentence be pleaded and 
proved.171 To conform to Blakely under the new sentencing proposal, 
prosecutors will need to actually plead and prove the domestic violence 
designation beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury, as though the designa-
tion were an element of the crime.172 For example, if a defendant is 
                                                            
 164. H.B. 2777 § 402(3)(h)(i), 61st Leg., Reg. Sess., 2010 Wash. Sess. Laws 2179, available at 
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2009-10/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Law%202010/2777-
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 165. PROPOSAL, supra note 2, at 9. 
 166. H.B. 2777 § 402(1)(h)(i). 
 167. Kathie Durbin, Bills Toughen Domestic Violence Sentencing, COLUMBIAN, Mar. 5, 2010, 
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 168. H.B. 2777 § 402(1)(h)(i). 
 169. Id.; see, e.g., State v. Spencer, 128 Wash. App. 132, 144, 114 P.3d 1222 (2005); State v. 
Clark, No. 54843-3-I, 2005 WL 1303489, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. May 23, 2005); State v. Felix, 125 
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 170. See Felix, 125 Wash. App. at 578. 
 171. Supra Part III.B. 
 172. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004). 
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charged with fourth-degree assault, domestic violence, the prosecutor 
will have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt not only the statutory ele-
ments of fourth-degree assault, but also the domestic violence nature of 
the crime as defined by RCW 10.99.020. But the domestic violence ele-
ment would not affect the conviction, only the sentencing. If the prosecu-
tor fails to prove the domestic violence designation, the sentence would 
simply “revert back to the sentencing structure currently in place.”173 
V. THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF HB 2777 
The sentencing reforms in HB 2777 are significant strides towards 
treating domestic violence sentencing with the seriousness it deserves. 
Further, it is noteworthy that the Bill was not created by the criminal-
justice community alone; domestic violence advocates from many differ-
ent organizations took part in its development.174 The widespread com-
munity involvement is important; it indicates both the support and wis-
dom of domestic violence service providers beyond the criminal justice 
system. 
HB 2777 is a step in the right direction for a number of reasons. 
First, increased sentencing for repeat domestic violence offenders not 
only recognizes the societal import of domestic violence, but also may 
deter repeat offenders. Second, specific emphasis on repeat felony of-
fenders also recognizes the recidivist nature of domestic violence. Third, 
HB 2777 highlights the seriousness of domestic violence offenses and 
ensures consistency with the way other crimes are sentenced. Finally, HB 
2777 is limited in scope, targeting only the “worst of the worst” domestic 
violence offenders, reducing its impact on the prison system. 
Despite the many strengths of HB 2777, increased sentencing raises 
certain concerns. First, HB 2777 fails to adequately address the need for 
domestic violence prevention. Second, increased sentencing may serve 
only to expand a prison system that is already at its capacity. The prison 
population in the United States is already both expansive and expensive; 
the United States has the highest documented incarceration rate in the 
                                                            
 173. PROPOSAL, supra note 2, at 8. 
 174. Id. at 3–4. The Proposal was created by a group of professionals who have devoted their 
careers to dealing with the devastating effects that domestic violence has on survivors, their families, 
and their communities. The attorney general’s domestic violence task force, which created the Pro-
posal, was comprised of experts from the criminal-justice community, including representatives 
from several county prosecutors’ offices: Benton, Snohomish, Kitsap, Thurston, Spokane, Yakima, 
Pierce, Clark, and King. The task force also included representatives from the Washington State 
Attorney General’s Office, the University of Montana School of Law, the Crystal Judson Family 
Justice Center, and other advocacy organizations. Id. at 6. 
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world.175 Further, some argue that the prison system is simply broken: it 
no longer, if it ever did, serves to rehabilitate prisoners. Finally, the pris-
on system actually causes more harm to communities than other alterna-
tives, and thus, increased sentencing under the Bill only exacerbates ex-
isting problems. Section A discusses the strengths of HB 2777 and ad-
dresses each of these concerns in turn. Section B discusses the weak-
nesses of HB 2777 and presents alternative views. 
A. Strengths of HB 2777 
1. Increased Sentencing May Deter Repeat Offenders 
Increased sentencing may deter batterers from reoffending.176 In 
crafting the Proposal, the task force considered a special report from the 
National Institute of Justice (NIJ Report) concerning the practical impli-
cations of current domestic violence research.177 Most previous research 
indicated that certainty of prosecution has a deterrent effect, but the se-
verity of punishment does not.178 The NIJ Report calls this conclusion 
into question, stating that more “intrusive” sentences, such as jail time, 
significantly reduce rearrest rates for domestic violence as compared to 
less intrusive sentences.179 Additionally, another study included in the 
NIJ Report “confirmed that sentence severity was significantly asso-
ciated with reduced recidivism.”180 
According to the NIJ Report, the research is fairly consistent: 
“Simply prosecuting offenders without regard to the specific risk they 
pose, unlike arresting domestic violence defendants, does not deter fur-
ther criminal abuse.”181 A defendant’s prior criminal history and history 
of abuse indicate the risk of reabuse.182 “The minority of abusers arrested 
who are low risk are unlikely to reabuse in the short run, whether prose-
cuted or not.”183 “Alternatively, without the imposition of significant 
sanctions . . . the majority of arrested abusers who are high risk will re-
abuse regardless of prosecution—many while the case against them is 
pending.”184 These findings suggest that the more invasive the communi-
                                                            
 175. ROY WALMSLEY, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUD., WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 1 
(2009), available at http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/law/research/icps/downloads/wppl-8th_41.pdf. 
 176. KLEIN, supra note 30, at 47. 
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 178. Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Habitual Offender Statutes and Criminal Deter-
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ty is in dealing with offenders, including increased sentencing and proba-
tion, the better the outcome in reducing recidivism.185 
In addition to the NIJ Report, the task force also considered a 2007 
Washington State Institute for Public Policy (WSIPP) study on static risk 
assessment186 in the Department of Corrections.187 WSIPP stated that 
“offenders with a record of domestic violence have higher felony and 
violent felony recidivism rates than offenders without a record of domes-
tic violence.”188 This is particularly true for the association between felo-
ny domestic violence and violent felony recidivism.189 As a result of this 
strong association, felony domestic violence has a high weight in the 
“Violent Score” on the static risk assessment.190 HB 2777 recognizes the 
high risk of reoffense in domestic violence crimes and may serve as a 
more effective deterrent. Further, HB 2777 recognizes that domestic vi-
olence is often recidivist in nature and offenders are likely to reoffend. 
2. The Recidivist Cycle of Violence 
According to Martin, “Felony domestic violence is the single great-
est predictor of future violent felony behavior. We see this pattern every 
day, and it too often leads to hospitalizations and even murder.”191 One 
of the greatest strengths of HB 2777 is its recognition of the recidivist 
nature of domestic violence and the danger that nature poses to victims. 
Both domestic abusers and domestic-abuse victims become trapped in a 
cycle of violence.192 The cycle of violence has three distinct phases: the 
tension-building phase, the acute-battering phase, and the contrite or 
                                                            
 185. Martin, supra note 19. 
 186. Static risk assessment is based on criminal history and demographics. For an explanation 
of WSIPP’s static risk assessment tool, see ROBERT BARNOSKI & ELIZABETH K. DRAKE, WASH. 
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 192. Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women’s Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefini-
tion of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1208 (1993); see also Hernandez v. 
Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 836–38 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing the cycle of violence); LENORA E. 
WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 55–75 (1979). 
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“honeymoon” phase.193 The first phase, tension building, is characterized 
by seemingly minor incidents.194 The victim strives to please his or her 
abuser’s desires, which are often irrational, anger-ridden, and ever-
changing.195 Over time, the tension builds, with the abuser becoming in-
creasingly more demanding, angry, and abusive.196 This continues until 
something snaps—there is a breaking point resulting in “an acute batter-
ing incident.”197 This is the phase where police intervention often oc-
curs⎯the violence is extreme and the abuser is nearly uncontrollable.198 
But this is generally not the end of the cycle. After the acute-battering 
phase, the abuser moves into the contrite, or honeymoon, phase, during 
which the abuser is apologetic, caring, even sweet; victims often describe 
an abuser as “the person they fell in love with.”199 This phase rarely lasts. 
Soon the tension-building phase once again begins, and the entire cycle 
repeats itself.200 
HB 2777 recognizes that often, domestic violence is repetitive in 
nature: “[d]omestic violence is not an isolated, individual event, but ra-
ther a pattern of repeated behaviors . . . against the same victim by the 
same perpetrator.”201 According to some, “the most effective way to pre-
vent domestic violence from occurring is for law enforcement officials to 
stop the ‘cycle of violence’ by implementing mandatory arrest and ‘no-
drop’ policies.”202 Yet, because many domestic violence crimes do not 
currently affect the offender score, these policies are ineffective at end-
ing the violence⎯the abuser is simply able to return home, pick up at the 
                                                            
 193. WALKER, supra note 192, at 55. 
 194. Id. at 56–59. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 57. 
 197. Id. at 59. 
 198. Id. at 59–65. 
 199. Id. at 65–70. 
 200. Id. at 69. 
 201. Ann L. Ganley, Understanding Domestic Violence: Preparatory Reading for Participants, 
in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A NATIONAL CURRICULUM FOR FAMILY PRESERVATION PRACTITIONERS 
60, 62 (1995), available at http://www.andvsa.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/60-ganely-general-
dv-article.pdf. 
 202. H. Morely Swingle et al., Unhappy Families: Prosecuting and Defending Domestic Vi-
olence Cases, 58 J. MO. B. 220, 220 (2002). A mandatory-arrest policy “requires a police officer to 
detain a person based on a probable cause determination that an offense occurred and that the ac-
cused person committed the offense.” RESPECTING ACCURACY IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REPORTING, 
JUSTICE DENIED: ARREST POLICIES IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 3 (2008), available at 
http://www.mediaradar.org/docs/RADARreport-Justice-Denied-DV-Arrest-Policies.pdf. Similarly, a 
no-drop policy generally provides that the victim of domestic violence cannot withdraw, or “drop,” a 
criminal complaint. Cathleen A. Booth, Note, No-Drop Policies: Effective Legislation or Protection-
ist Attitude?, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 621, 634 (1999). Both mandatory-arrest policies and no-drop poli-
cies are controversial. See id.; Donna Wills, Domestic Violence: The Case for Aggressive Prosecu-
tion, 7 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 173, 180 (1997). 
2011] Domestic Violence Sentencing in Washington State 985 
honeymoon phase, and continue the cycle. HB 2777 requires courts to 
consider an offender’s full criminal record, including past misdemeanor 
domestic violence convictions, during sentencing.203 True intervention is 
thus possible at an earlier point⎯the courts will not have to wait until a 
victim is killed before imposing a lengthy sentence. 
Longer sentences may serve an additional purpose: to give the vic-
tims time to move on by finding safety, a new community, and a support 
system. Abusers rarely let a victim walk away; they will use violence and 
other control tactics to maintain the relationship.204 Increased sentencing 
helps the victim break free, which is vital. Without increased sentencing, 
post-release the abuser and victim are at high risk to fall back into the 
previous cycle of violence. Because domestic violence relationships are 
complicated, marked by domination and control, and victims have often 
been isolated from friends and family, it can be difficult for victims to 
safely break the cycle of violence on their own.205 In fact, one author de-
scribed the difficulties of leaving, stating: 
[He] always found ways to get her to come back. He would 
come and tell her how sorry he was and how much he loved her; 
he would promise never to do it again. And she wanted to be-
lieve him. . . . When she wavered and it appeared his pleas and 
promises might not work, he would threaten to kill her if she re-
fused to come home, threats which his past behavior gave her 
every reason to take seriously.206 
The disturbing phenomenon of separation assault exacerbates the 
difficulty of safe separation.207 Victims are at their greatest risk when 
they separate from their abusers.208 In over 70% of domestic violence 
injuries, the homicide or injury occurred after the victim had left, di-
vorced, separated from, or attempted to leave the abuser.209 The most 
extreme violence and the most severe injuries often occur at separa-
tion.210 Moreover, the majority of domestic violence fatalities happen 
shortly after separation.211 Hence, longer sentences may allow victims to 
safely separate from their abusers. 
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3. HB 2777 Treats Recidivist Domestic Violence Seriously 
HB 2777 mandates that courts recognize the serious nature of do-
mestic violence crimes and sentence them accordingly. The NIJ Report 
provides that “[s]entences that do not reflect a defendant’s prior criminal 
history (and prior sentences) may suggest to the defendant that domestic 
violence offenses are not taken as seriously as other offenses.”212 Domes-
tic violence sentencing was, prior to HB 2777, disproportionately light 
and inconsistent with sentencing for other crimes. For example, in a re-
cent case, an abuser held a broken glass bottle to the bare neck of his 
girlfriend, threatened to kill her, and chased her out of the house with 
scissors.213 He was subsequently arrested for assault.214 Yet if convicted, 
he could face as little as three months in jail, even if he has multiple mis-
demeanor domestic violence charges.215 But under HB 2777, prior do-
mestic violence misdemeanors would be considered in his sentencing, 
resulting in a sentence up to four times longer.216 
Moreover, HB 2777 could help change perceptions of domestic vi-
olence in the criminal justice system. Many judges simply do not take 
domestic violence as seriously as other crimes. For example, in the pre-
vious case, despite a prosecution motion to set bail at $50,000, the de-
fendant’s bail was set at just $5,000.217 According to a prosecutor at the 
Clark County Domestic Violence Prosecution Center, this is a symptom 
of a larger problem: courts do not take domestic violence sentencing se-
riously.218 The Clark County prosecutor stated, “Some courts, when they 
hear the term ‘domestic violence,’ automatically set the sentence lighter. 
There are a couple of judges in the community who still see domestic 
violence as something that can be taken care of in the home or through 
marriage counseling.”219 Essentially, many prosecutors and judges are 
not as concerned about crimes against intimate partners as they are about 
crimes against strangers, and it shows.220 Stronger sentencing laws may 
result in a cognitive shift⎯by statutorily treating domestic violence as a 
serious crime, culturally, the criminal justice system and communities 
will begin to recognize the seriousness of the crime. This broader cultural 
shift is vital to protect women. Currently, stranger assaults receive 
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stronger sentences, and police respond faster to stranger-assailant emer-
gency calls than to domestic-partner calls.221 
4. HB 2777 Targets Only Felony Repeat Offenders 
Finally, HB 2777 is restrained in scope: it targets only felony repeat 
offenders⎯the “worst of the worst”222⎯10% of all domestic violence 
offenders. Further, the Bill only affects recidivist offenders, which com-
prise 10% of felony domestic offenders.223 Thus, in order to be affected 
by the Bill, an offender must offend at the felony level multiple times. 
And because the Bill impacts a relatively small subclass of offenders, it 
will neither result in a great increase in the number of people sentenced, 
nor result in nonviolent offenders receiving greatly increased sentences. 
It will only affect those offenders who truly pose a risk to society and 
have proved that risk by offending multiple times. 
B. Potential Weaknesses and Alternative Views 
A highly skilled team of domestic violence advocates created HB 
2777, but like all things, it is not without criticism. HB 2777 aims to give 
teeth to the DVA by bringing domestic violence sentencing in line with 
sentencing for other crimes. After all, there is something inherently 
wrong with the idea that three felony car thefts results in a five-year pris-
on sentence while three felony domestic violence crimes results in a 
nine-to-twelve-month sentence.224 But this reasoning assumes the prob-
lem is that domestic violence sentencing is too low. There is another 
view of the problem: maybe domestic violence sentencing is not too low, 
but sentencing for car theft is too high. That is to say, maybe we have not 
undersentenced domestic violence, but rather oversentenced other 
crimes. 
There are a number of reasons why increased sentencing may not 
be the appropriate way to regulate domestic violence. First, HB 2777 
fails to provide adequate prevention measures. Second, the prison system 
in the United States is both expansive and expensive, and it hinders de-
velopment of services to victims and longer societal solutions to domes-
tic violence. Finally, while prisons serve a retributive purpose, they do 
not rehabilitate. 
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1. HB 2777 Does Not Demand Prevention 
The Domestic Violence Fatality Review (DVFR) reports that in 
“almost all cases” of domestic violence, victims report the violence to at 
least one person. In contrast, only 51% contacted law enforcement, 29% 
sought court orders,225 and a mere 12% contacted a domestic violence 
advocate.226 Despite the fact that almost all victims report the abuse to a 
friend, family member, or coworker, “[i]n most cases . . . community 
members did not have the information or skills they needed to help.”227 
Similarly, review panels found that “schools did not provide adequate 
education or resources to address dating violence”228 and “communities 
completely lacked tools outside the legal system to respond to abusers’ 
violence.”229 
While HB 2777 increases sentencing for repeat felony domestic vi-
olence offenders, it does not demand community education or prevention 
programs for domestic violence. And while increased sentencing ad-
dresses a serious need, if the Washington State legislature is serious 
about reducing domestic violence, more prevention is needed. As made 
clear by the DVFR, law enforcement is not enough. Community educa-
tion and prevention programs must be established in order to empower 
communities to address the problem of domestic violence. 
Such prevention programs are not unprecedented. For example, 
Washington State has a Washington Traffic Safety Commission 
(WTSC), which identifies “priority” areas in traffic safety.230 The WTSC 
has identified “impaired driving” as a priority and states, “We’re work-
ing with other state agencies to keep alcohol- and drug-impaired drivers 
off the roads. Washington wants to increase impaired driving arrests, 
improve prosecution, set up more DUI courts, and promote the use of 
ignition-interlock devices.”231 HB 2777 fails to adequately establish simi-
lar prevention and education for domestic violence. 
A similar Domestic Violence Commission could address core needs 
in prevention of domestic violence, including the need for safety plan-
ning, education, and improved access to services for victims in historical-
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ly “marginalized communities,” all of which have been identified as key 
areas to improve Washington State’s response to domestic violence.232 
2. The Prison System Is Expansive and Expensive 
The U.S. prison population is disproportionately high. In the past 
twenty years, the number of people in prison has not just increased but 
increased exponentially⎯by over 400%.233 Globally, the United States 
has only 5% of the world’s population,234 yet the United States claims 
over 25% of the world’s prison population.235 Over 7.3 million people 
are in the prison system⎯one out of every thirty-one Americans is either 
in jail, on probation, or on parole.236 
In Washington, the prison population has nearly tripled since 
1970⎯there are now over 17,926 people incarcerated in the state.237 
While growing at a rate slower than the national average, the growth in 
Washington’s prison population is significant.238 Further, WSIPP antic-
ipates that the incarceration rate will increase another 10% by 2019.239 In 
2010, the cost to house each offender in the Washington prison system 
was $94.84 per day.240 The average yearly medical cost per offender was 
$6,413.241 
HB 2777 not only fails to demand adequate prevention programs, 
but also shifts money and resources to expand the already bloated prison 
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system. While asserting intent to “improve the ability of agencies to ad-
dress the needs of victims and their children and the delivery of servic-
es,” the Bill fails to fund services for victims. Such funding is vital: ade-
quate access to shelter services lead to a 60%–70% reduction in inci-
dence and severity of reassault.242 In the 2006 fiscal year, the Washing-
ton State Domestic Violence Hotline answered 22,370 calls; domestic 
violence programs served 19,456 adults and children; domestic violence 
shelters provided emergency shelter for 6,147 survivors and their child-
ren; and an additional 36,522 were turned away.243 
While shifting funds from the prison system to victim services is a 
persuasive argument at first glance, it should also be noted that the finan-
cial cost of the sentencing reforms in HB 2777 is marginal.244 Because 
scoring will not start until August 2011, and because the changes are en-
tirely prospective, all domestic violence offenders are essentially starting 
at zero for enhanced scoring. An offender cannot receive an enhanced 
offender score under HB 2777 until the State has pleaded and proved 
domestic violence in cases that occur after August 2011, there is a quali-
fying conviction, and the defendant reoffends at a felony level with a 
qualifying conviction. Thus, the initial fiscal impacts of the program are 
negligible.245 
Ultimately, whether one agrees that increased sentencing is the best 
solution depends on whether one believes that the prison system is the 
best and most effective way to address domestic violence. The efficacy 
of the prison system will be addressed in the next subsection, which con-
siders the rehabilitative effect of prisons. 
3. Prisons Are Ill-Suited for Rehabilitation 
As early as the late 1700s, reformers advocated for a change in the 
way criminal punishment was administered.246 The idea emerged that if 
punishment moved from the public sphere into the private sphere, pu-
nishment would move beyond revenge and into reform.247 As the idea of 
prisons being places of “religious self-reflection and self-reform” devel-
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oped, so did the idea of the penitentiary.248 There were two early models 
of penitentiaries, the Pennsylvania system and the New York system, and 
both emphasized isolation and solitude.249 These systems have been criti-
cized since their birth.250 While some believed that self-reflection would 
lead to “moral renewal and thus mold convicts into better citizens,” 
Charles Dickens believed that “[t]hose who have undergone this punish-
ment MUST pass into society again morally unhealthy and diseased.”251 
Today, many prisons draw on the historical concept of the penitentiary; 
however, nearly all reference to individual rehabilitation has been aban-
doned.252 
Prison abolitionists argue that prisons are ill-suited for individual 
rehabilitation⎯they no longer, if they ever truly did, serve a rehabilita-
tive purpose. Prisons are simply ineffective at dealing with gender vi-
olence, and despite an exponential increase in the numbers of men in 
prisons, women are not any safer from sexual assault or domestic vi-
olence.253 
Despite the flaws of the prison system, even prison abolitionists 
concede that people who “exhibit persistent patterns of behavior defined 
as dangerous, require restraint or limited movement for specific periods 
of their lives.”254 “The goal of such ‘last resort’ procedures [such as pris-
on] should be to work out the least restrictive and most humane option 
for the shortest stated period of time.”255 It is notable that HB 2777 is 
consistent with the idea that people who have consistently proved them-
selves to be dangerous must be restrained because the Bill is limited to 
offenders who have proved through repeated felony domestic violence 
offenses that imprisonment is the only feasible solution to stop their be-
havior. Yet the Bill fails to provide adequate treatment programs or reha-
bilitation for offenders. 
The Washington State legislature has funded, albeit on a limited ba-
sis, several offender programs, including vocational education, basic 
education, cognitive behavior treatment (including “Moral Reconation,” 
“Stress & Anger Management,” and “Getting It Right”), and chemical 
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dependency programs.256 But more must be done to ensure that repeat 
offenders do not simply serve longer prison sentences. In order for longer 
sentences to be truly meaningful, there must be adequate, targeted treat-
ment and education programs. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
HB 2777 is excellent at what it aims to do: ensure that chronic do-
mestic violence offenders serve proportional prison sentences. It is a 
moderate change, applying to only 10% of those convicted of domestic 
violence crimes⎯repeat offenders with established records of abuse.257 
Moreover, as previously noted, the Proposal for HB 2777 was not 
created by the criminal justice system alone. Rather, the domestic vi-
olence community as a whole contributed, and ultimately, it is the con-
tinued work and support of the domestic violence community that is 
needed to fully enact the intent of the Bill. 
But in order to truly effect systemic change and alter the patterns of 
violence, there must be community alternatives that help prevent future 
violence, adequate services and protection for victims of violence, and 
programs to help rebuild communities damaged by violence.258 Such al-
ternatives include community-based economic resources, education 
models, forums, services, and medical care.259 These services are vital to 
addressing the pervasive problem of domestic violence. Treating domes-
tic violence seriously must go beyond increased sentencing for repeat 
felony offenders. We must do more⎯we must empower communities to 
effectively address domestic violence. 
Increased punishment alone will simply never be enough⎯the leg-
islature must fulfill its expressed intent; it must not only increase sen-
tences, but also increase safe access to services for victims, improve 
treatment programs, and improve agencies’ abilities to address victims’ 
needs. Ultimately, “[t]he question is not how to abolish or improve pris-
ons; it is how to change a society that is becoming so largely inhuman, 
unjust, self-centered, [and] indifferent to the suffering of others.”260 
Hopefully, increased sentencing for repeat domestic violence offenders is 
a step towards this goal. But we must do more: we must hold the legisla-
ture accountable by insisting that it provide prevention services, educa-
tion services, and victim services, not just longer prison sentences. 
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